The drachma path

Once more the scenarios of a possible Greek exit from the Eurozone are in fashion. We also see scenarios of a Greek exit from the EU. Most media and commentators replicate the mutterings of European or Greek or other investment experts. In this mess the conspiracy theories abound while some of the Greeks prepare for the day after others do not believe that it is possible. In this article, Andreas Koutras examines some of the key points. Is Europe bluffing and would never let Greece go? What is the financial cost to Europe? Would metastasis of the problem occur and can the risk be mitigated? What is the legal framework for exit? What are the steps of introducing a new currency. Would Greece thrive after the change or would it collapse to a failed state?

The full article of A. Koutras:

Today’s Situation

The Greek state has gone bust after years of financial mismanagement, corruption and nepotism that created a state economy of soviet proportions. The European partners rushed to Greece’s help and gave loans albeit with strict conditionality. However, they made these loans to the people and the parties that were responsible for the mess in the first place. It was like West Germany giving money to Eric Honecker in order to disband his Stasi, restructure East Germany and prepare it for unification. As it happens the people objected to this idea. Unfortunately, this objection took the form of refusing the European help and path. In other words many identify Europe and in particular Germany as the culprit.

Populist politicians are not a rare species in Greek politics. In fact they form the overwhelming majority. The lack of rational debate that was promoted by most political parties finally paid off. No-one can easily discern fantasy from reality. Conspiracy theories have displaced common sense. Many voters wanting to punish the politicians responsible for this and possibly their own selves for voting for them all these years cast their vote to the suicidal left and extreme right (including fascists). Europe responded to this with a simple proposition “Either in with our terms or out”.

The bluff hypothesis

A basic objection that one hears often against the European position is that Europe is bluffing. There is no way that Greece can be kicked out or that Greece would leave the Euro. Let us see if this is true. Those who play games like poker know well the concept of a bluff. The same bluff cannot be performed by more than 1-2 players. Europe and Eurozone is not one player but 17 (in the case of Eurozone). To think that 10 or more of these countries, European commissioners, ministers and other politicians have agreed to bluff is a conspiracy theory. Three years now and the same players have not managed to solve a problem that represents 2% of the European GDP. Did by magic agree to bluff? Reality is somewhat different.

The constant vacillations of Greece have exposed the weaknesses of the economy and the gap between Greece and Europe in the areas of political rationality and discourse, social structure and culture. European policy makers are beginning to discern that the main problem in Greece is not financial in essence. The crisis is Greece was not a result of the world credit crunch or of bad lending practices by the banks. This was not clear to most Europeans when they signed the first bailout and MOU. The degree of total mess the Greek state was in was not known nor the corruption at all levels of the state apparatus. Now however, things are different. Slowly, a consensus opinion is formed that argues that it is time to put a backstop on the losses and instead concentrate in saving Spain. At least Spain conforms with most of the dictates and does not have second thoughts on the European future. It is not coincidental that we frequently hear of good wishes when it comes to Greece. Everyone is wishing for Greece to stay in Europe. It is like the priest giving the last rites to a terminally ill patient. In other words a new dynamic seems to be shaping that wants Greece outside Europe.

But it is not just the “bad Europeans” that want this outcome. Many in Greece wish for the same outcome. Some, for ideological reasons, others because they naively believe that they would make money in the process. Many, because they see political gains or the chance to govern and others because of obscure personal reasons. There is no conspiracy. Some are dressing their opinion in nationalist paranoia and others in socialist or communist terms. There are always the ones that simply want to see their debts reduced. The beloved dear uncle is dying and relatives, wives, mistresses and servants rush to the house to get the wall paintings and the silverware while others are trying to influence the will.

The exit cost

A frequent argument against kicking Greece out is that it is going to cost the other European countries huge amounts of money. Here, we need to clarify few points. The Treaties do not allow for kicking a member out. Article 7 only mentions suspension of parts of the treaty and only if there is a breach of article 2 which basically refers to democracy, human rights, equality etc.

Thus assuming that Greece does not degenerate to this level it can only ask to leave the EE or the Eurozone. How much would this cost. I am sure many policy makers and countries have done this paper exercise. Most calculations would be probably be wrong but need to start somewhere. Let’s give a brief look at some numbers:

  • The Hellenic Republic has around 65billion of bonds outstanding under English law. The current market price is around 20% or 13billion. Thus if Greece declares a moratorium the maximum loss would not exceed 13billion, assuming that bondholders have marked to market their holdings.
  • The IMF and EU loans would be around 240billion in nominal terms (including the money allocated for Greek banks). It would be prudent not to annoy the IMF so let us assume that Greece keeps servicing the IMF but imposes a moratorium on interest rate payments to the rest. As these loans carry an average coupon of around 3% the losses would be 7-8billion a year. These loans do not need to be repaid till 2022-2042 anyway. Moreover, all of these loans are under non-Greek law (English), and this means that when and if Greece decides to rejoin the European family these would have to be settled somehow. For example the Greek revolutionary loan of 1825 was finally settled in 1930, a mere 105 years later. The PSI in this respect is a double edged sword.
  • ECB. The ECB that was exempted from the PSI still owns around 50billion of Greek debt. We do not know the terms of these bonds or where they are marked by the ECB as the swap was done in secret. However we can conservatively assume that 50billion losses are on the cards. The EU however, can use the special account that was created to keep on servicing these bonds directly and simply add the cost to the amount the Greeks owe to Europe.
  • Then there is Target2. The obligations of the Bank of Greece towards the Eurosystem. These are estimated at around 130billion. It is not known how a breakup can be implemented. Could it be that the ECB provides some help to the reborn BoG to settle this and pay in the next 50y? Who knows?

The truth is that on a nominal basis the total loss would be north of 400billion but when one looks at the immediate losses then these are very manageable by the rest of Europe. The question is, how much would Europe save by stopping payments to Greece versus the money to keep Greece in the intensive care. How many more Eurogroup meetings would have to be done and how much political capital would be thrown on the Greek problem. This is a much harder calculation and any guesses are welcome. Would Europe simply postpone the inevitable for Greece at the risk of a much higher bang later? These are some of the enigmas that European policy makers are asked to solve. Greece has many wounds and not all are healed by throwing money.

The conclusion is that the exit cost is high but not unbearable. In any case, it is not politicians who are going to pay but the taxpayers of the remaining member states. If European taxpayers buy the argument then the probabilities of a Greek exit increase. Recent polls show an increasing trend in this direction.

The contagion cost

The third and perhaps more serious objection against a Greek exit is the danger that there may be a contagion, a metastasis of the crisis to other peripheral countries like Spain. Many argue that this is going to be the end of the United Europe. Europe would break up, Germany would lose and finally capitalism would be defeated by the socialist forces. The truth is that if Greece had left 2 years ago the tremors would have been significantly stronger. Now, and after a successful PSI (remains to be seen whose success it is) there is no danger of a financial or banking collapse. Parties have done their war exercises and simulations and we are told that they are prepared for some of the worst contingencies.

However, there is always the political and social risk. In reality the market is pricing correctly the financial implications of a Greek exit but has no way of estimating the risk of metastasis in Spain or other European country. Are these two events correlated? In other words, if tomorrow Greece decides to do everything that the Troika demands and stays in the Euro would the Spanish zombie banks come back to life? Would there be a rush to buy Spanish properties? Probably not. Maybe, this is why France and Germany are trying to raise a firewall. Hollande’s victory might speed up this process.

Talk of growth is just political crumps. European states must find ways to reduce their debts and deficits and in many cases do the structural changes (similar to those that are demanded in Greece) before they proceed with money printing. The challenge of the politicians is on how to sell this policy. Here lies the real danger for Greece. If Greece continues the ambivalent policies towards Europe, then Europe might decide to save Spain and do a catharsis with Greece. In other words Greece would be the catalyst that is going to propel Europe to a faster federal union but is not going to take part in it.

It is certainly true that the probabilities of an EU breakup are higher than they were 5y ago but most who opine it are doing it in bad faith rather than rational argument. United Europe took a long time to form and was the dream of many for generations. The union has made many mistakes but it is a living organism that evolves and adapts. In the process some countries may drop out while others may be at a disadvantage, but the main idea would survive.

Legal exit parameters

Until the Lisbon treaty there were no provisions for a member’s exit. Article 50 introduced such a possibility. However, article 50 only refers to an exit from the union and not from the monetary union. As it is natural, legal opinion is divided. There are those who believe that an exit can happen only if Greece uses this process to get out of Europe and then tries to re-enter with a special status like Britain. Others are of the opinion of a selective suspension of articles related to the monetary union.

In both cases, it seems the legal and mental jumps are great and Europe would have to structure procedures on the go. Both procedures are also time consuming. For example the first one needs 72% majority (minimum 65% of population) and the consent of the European parliament. In the end any obstacles would be cleared politically rather than legally and details would be filled on the fly. History does not offer many examples. The traditional empires or federations (if we can call Europe as such) do not easily allow members to flee. Many times the centrifugal or secessionist forces are crushed with force. We do not think that this is realistic in our case. The example of the Soviet Union is not similar as there was a massive breakup.

The selective suspension of articles has also some interesting complications but at least spares Greece the negotiations for re-entry (article 48). A danger in this case is that the right to selectively suspend some articles may be extended to other chapters and other countries.

The choice of a unilateral exit by Greece would be the most problematic and dangerous as Greece would breach the treaties.

However, by far the biggest hurdle is how Europe and Greece would react from the time of the exit announcement to the final exit. This may take few weeks or more likely months.

New Greek Drachma

There are many technical problems that make the reappearance of the New Greek Drachma (or whatever the new name is going to be) problematic. Most of the problems though are Greek and not European.

History has many examples of currency changes but most if not all deal with the demise of an old currency and the introduction of a new one. In other words the old currency stops being a legal tender and to be accepted as a means of exchange. As such the incentive of currency holders is to give up the old for the new no matter how low the value is. States recognize the sovereign right of a country to issue a currency and determine the exchange rate (Lex Monetae). In the case of the Euro things are different. The Euro would still exist and most probably would be a stronger currency than the NGRD. Also according to protocol 24 (3rd stage of EMU) that sovereign right was taken away and pooled together with the other countries to create the Euro. Putting these details on the side a possible sequence of actions and events could be (The actions are highly speculative and hypothetical)

  • The Hellenic Republic passes a law giving the BoG the right to issue NGD, to conduct monetary policy, to oversee Greek banks and to provide liquidity in the new currency. In addition it freezes banking transactions in order to change the Euros of all Greek citizens into NGRD. The original exchange rate does not matter at all whether it is 1 to 1 or 1 Euro to 100NGRD. It is a nominal exchange. What matter is what you can buy with it.
  • Another law forces redenomination of all liabilities and contracts made under Greek law to NGRD.
  • As it is highly unlikely that paper notes would be ready in time, Greece might decide to stamp or otherwise cancel the paper Euro already in the banks with 100Euro Cancel-100NGRD. This may need the consent of the ECB as the notes are liabilities of the ECB. NCB are allowed to print notes according to their quota and the notes are distinguished by the first letter in front of the numbers. For example Greece has Y while Germany has X and Spain V. This however, cannot be used as a criterion since banknotes circulate across Europe. We can assume that electronic transfers would begin faster than the paper money as it only involves changing computer code.
  • What is going to happen to the Greek banks? Their bonds if issued under Greek law would redenominate while those under English law most probably would not. The same goes for Greek corporates. For other contracts and derivatives it gets more complicated.
  • Collateral given to the ECB would no longer be valid although in anticipation of such a move Greek banks would have requested funding from the ELA mechanism which is the liability of the Greek state. This would then be converted to the NGRD. Thus an early warning sign could be a massive increase in the ELA (currently at 54billion).
  • The BoG would no longer be a Eurosystem member and ECB should return the capital plus any reserves (including gold) that the BoG contributed originally. However, the BoG would have a massive liability towards the Eurosystem through the Target2 imbalances. Would the other NCB’s accept the loss? Who decides any disputes?

In conclusion if Greece decides to change the Euro into NGRD it would encounter many problems. Anyone having Euros outside the banking system would hoard them and anyone having Euros inside the banking system would try to take them out causing a bank run. In no way this is a smooth changeover. Black market would thrive and almost certainly there would be controls on the movement of capital and foreign exchange and price controls. For a considerable period absurdity would rule and there is a real danger of a failed state. It is conceivable that enhanced security measure would be introduced to safeguard public and state enterprises, banks and other assets. The biggest losers would be public servants, pensioners and salaried workers that have not hoarded Euros or other hard assets. The example of Argentina where bank safe deposits were opened and the dollars found were converted might be replicated.

The abovementioned actions are highly hypothetical and speculative. For the changeover to the NGRD to be successful Greece needs social calmness, planning and organization. These are hardly qualities that characterize the Greek state. In addition, many of the actions described, if they happen, breach fundamental rules and values of the EU. In other words, it is possible that article 7 and 2 (mentioned earlier) might be used to suspend Greece. Again this is a possibility but chances are that Europe would help Greece overcome some of the hurdles in the changeover.

GreekEconomy

If Greece crosses the transitional period successfully then the economic pros and cons would not take long to manifest. Obviously, the devaluation shock would be good for Greek exports and tourism. The abrupt reduction in wage cost if it is accompanied by structural reforms and opening of the economy would most probably be beneficial and the economy would jumpstart very fast. If FDI is encouraged by tax, and labor laws then the possibility of averting hyperinflation is realistic. Greece would need to find hard currency to pay for energy (current account balance is -19billion) and Europe and the IMF would help there.

The bad scenario is if Greece decides to go autistic and closes up in which case the probabilities of a failed state increase. The rapid reduction in the GDP would not be reversed and Greece might degenerate fast. Traditionally, immigration acted as a safety valve (witness the millions of Greek diaspora) and we will probably see this again.

Conclusion

The possibility of Greece exiting the Euro and introducing NGRD is neither impossible nor highly improbable. Whether this would mean catastrophe depends on how the state and the people are going to handle the changeover, especially after they lost a significant part of their wealth. It is my conviction that Greece should fight to stay in the Euro and try to avoid the adventure of introducing a new currency by force. Exiting the Euro is a very expensive very volatile and very dangerous way of a state reducing its liabilities (salaries, pensions etc) as most of the loans are not under its jurisdiction and cannot be reduced to zero with a simple law (like the PSI). In any case the structural changes in the economy would have to be done, Euro or NGRD.

About A_Koutras

In Touch Capital Markets

This entry was posted in Banking and finance, Europe, Macroeconomics, Public finance. Bookmark the permalink.

8 Responses to The drachma path

  1. Alex says:

    Strangely, while the author argues against a Greek Eurozone exit, and I found the tone to be partisan in many areas, he actually makes the case for an exit. With a correctly managed exit, as he points out, ‘the economy would jumpstart very fast’. With a badly managed exit, the result is much the same as with a badly managed anything. We are badly managed right now, with the fourth worst GDP real growth rate golbally, ranking just above Anguilla, Yemen, and Libya. He also neglects to mention what his prognosis is for continuing down the existing path, which is starting to look failed-state-ish already from my vantage point here in Athens.

  2. Myrto says:

    I agree with other comments that we need more of this type of information, and not the fanaticized paranoia that is to be found across TV stations, political party announcements and online. If we are so anxious to be proud and worthy of our ancestors, we should be able to distinguish “logos” from “pathos”. At our current state of political and cultural degeneration, their bones are probably shaking in their tombs, as the greek saying goes. Whatever each person votes, we should at least base it on informed and realistic assessments of the situation. Our future governments and the future of our country will mirror our own level, so we need to make critical decisions with a cold head.
    And as others have mentioned, we need to realize that we need reforms anyway, irrespective of the currency. Fantasies that getting out of the euro is the easy way out of problems are quite naive. We have always been a poor country and prosperity does not come free. Euro or drachma, unless we make the necessary painful reforms, we cannot expect to have a high standard of living.
    Current rhetoric however revolves around the horrible “austerity” on the one hand, and some imaginary “revolution” on the other, which will revert things back to their prior status: a corrupt, gigantic state, always willing to hire, providing lush benefits and immune to outside pressures. There’s a middle ground and we need to tap into it.

  3. DkJordan says:

    Interesting article, with many areas to consider. One thing immediately comes out: the same reforms are needed in or out of the euro, hence the only reason to implements them outside is out of social and political immaturity. Of course this is defining characteristic of Greece.

    I have two questions I would like to pose as your expertise in economics exceeds mine:
    1. Can’t the Eurozone push Greece out in a much simpler way? The next time there’s a negative reaction to the reforms package in Greece e.g. By the left wing Syriza party should they come to power, they find the country n breach of the bailout contract and arbitrarily terminate financing effectively forcing a bankruptcy. This may seem extreme but it may become politically acceptable soon.

    2. Does Greece need to reissue drachmas or whatever ? Can it not continue using the euro even if it leaves the Eurozone like Montenegro etc? Would that not be just as well since it would force fiscal discipline and avoid the complexities of introducing a new currency underwritten by a failed state, hence worthless…

    Looking forward to any comments you may have.

  4. PJM says:

    A very interesting article.
    What if at the same time as it withdrew from the EU and eurozone, Greece adopted monetary reform as proposed by Positive Money UK? To find out more, go to the organisation’s website http://www.positivemoney.org.uk
    Positive Money has on its website a proposed “Creation of Currency” Bill that contains all the technical details to change the way that banks operate.
    All new metal and paper drachma would be issued by the government-owned Reserve Bank of Greece in the usual way, and all new electronic drachma would be created, free of interest and free of debt, by employees of the government-owned Reserve Bank of Greece tapping on computer keyboards under the direction of a new, independent Greek Monetary Policy Committee, at a rate just sufficient to keep inflation at zero, and spent into circulation by the Greek government according to its democratic mandate. Greek banks would be restricted to lending only their own capital and the term deposits that their customers had lent to them. In this way, no commercial bank would ever again be allowed to create drachma out of nothing and lend them into circulation as interest-bearing debt. For the first time in hundreds of years, Greece would actually become a sovereign democracy. This would put an end to the boom/bust cycles that have plagued the people for hundreds of years, ever since fractional reserve banking was developed. Freedom at last!

    • Thanasis Stengos says:

      As a response to PJM: This is exactly what North Korea does and Albania 30 years ago used to do. This is the type of naive response to a real danger that the opinion article by Koutras raises as a dinstict possibility. The main issue is that we cannot cut ourselves off from the rest of Europe (and the world) unless we want to be part of a “failed” state. The debate should center about the possible ramifications of our choices and that implies assigning “probabilities” to each event. So far, the debate uses a two-point probability distribution, zero and one. A serious debate should consider many possible in-between values and the calculation of the costs and benefits appropriately discounted (using again different discount rates).

      • PJM says:

        You mean you’re perfectly happy to have private banks create 97% of your nation’s currency out of thin air and lend it into circulation as interest-bearing debt? Now that really is being naive!
        References to Albania and North Korea are nothing more than red herrings — pun intended.
        Please, don’t even think about engaging in derogatory debate with me until after you have read the new book “Where Does Money Come From?”, which you can buy on the Positive Money UK website.
        The Positive Money proposals would allow industrial capitalism to at last free itself from financial capitalism and lead to a new era of prosperity and real democracy.
        The 16th president of the United States, Abraham Lincoln, is quoted as having said “If the American people knew tonight, exactly how the monetary and banking system worked, there would be a revolution before tomorrow morning.” Henry Ford, founder of the Ford Motor Company, is quoted as having said much the same thing early in the 20th century.
        And no wonder that Mervyn King, governor of the Bank of England, said as recently as October 2010 in a speech he gave in New York, “Of all the many ways of organising banking, the worst is the one we have today.”
        Martin Wolf, the Chief Economics Editor at the Financial Times, said: “The essence of the contemporary monetary system is the creation of money, out of nothing, by registered banks’ often foolish lending…”
        Banks create new money (the numbers in your bank account) when they make loans. As the Bank of England says, “When banks make loans they create additional [bank] deposits for those that have borrowed the money.” (Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin 2007 Q3, p377). This means that in the UK, nearly every pound in the economy today was created when somebody went into debt. All the money that we need to trade, to buy food, and to run businesses, must be borrowed from the profit-seeking banking sector, at a huge cost to us, and a massive benefit to them.
        The famous economist J.K. Galbraith said “The process by which banks create money is so simple the mind is repelled. With something so important, a deeper mystery seems only decent.”

  5. Θοδωρής Ζαρέτος says:

    Το σχόλιό μου δεν έχει να κάνει με το περιεχόμενο του άρθρου, με το οποίο συμφωνώ απολύτως. Είναι επείγουσα η ανάγκη να αποκτήσει μεγαλύτερη δημοσιότητα και διείσδυση στους απλούς πολίτες ο Λόγος απέναντι στο Συναίσθημα, η Σύνθεση απέναντι στον Μύθο, η Οργάνωση απέναντι στην Αμεριμνησία, η Δημιουργικότητα απέναντι στην Αγανάκτηση. Το πρόβλημα που αντιμετωπίζει αυτή τη στιγμή η χώρα μας είναι κρίσιμο για κοινωνικούς και όχι τόσο για οικονομικούς λόγους. Δεν είναι δυνατόν, παρ’ όλη την κρισιμότητα της κατάστασης να ξεπεράσουμε τη βαθειά ριζωμένη συνήθεια-πεποίθηση ότι μπορούμε να ζούμε σύμφωνα με τις επιθυμίες μας και όχι σύμφωνα με τι δυνατότητές μας. Αυτός είναι ο λόγος που μετεκλογικά όλα τα κόμματα και ιδιαίτερα ΠΑΣΟΚ και ΝΔ έχουν μεταθέσει τον λόγο τους στο πεδίο των σχέσεών μας με τους δανειστές τελευταίας ευκαιρίας, προσπαθώντας να αντιμετωπίσουν τον τυχοδιωκτικό λαϊκισμό της αριστεράς και της πατριδοκάπηλης δεξιάς. Το αποτέλεσμα είναι να ενισχύεται ανάμεσα στους Έλληνες πολίτες η πλάνη ότι η λύση των προβλημάτων μας δεν είναι κυρίως εσωτερική μας υπόθεση, αλλά μία διαπραγμάτευση με τους δανειστές μας που όσο πιο “σκληροί και ασυμβίβαστοι” παρουσιαστούμε σ’ αυτήν τόσο πιό καλά θα είναι δήθεν τα αποτελάσματα για τον “λαό”. Οι ψύχραιμες, τεκμηριωμένες, επιστημονικές προσεγγίσεις δεν βρίσκουν γόνιμο έδαφος να αναπτυχθούν και καταδικάζονται εύκολα στην συνείδηση της κοινής γνώμης, υπό το κράτος μιάς βλακώδους συνομωσιολογικής πρόσληψης της πραγματικότητας, ενός χρόνιου λαϊκισμού και μιάς αναθεματολογικής καταδίκης κάθε πρότασης που θέτει την επείγουσα ανάγκη ενός “εσωτερικού μνημονίου”. Ενός μνημονίου που θα θέτει την προοπτική μιας διαφορετικής συνύπαρξης των Ελλήνων πολιτών. Με όρους τέτοιους ώστε για πρώτη φορά στην ιστορία του Νεοελληνικού κράτους να συνομολογείται και να τηρείται η υπεροχή του δημοσίου συμφέροντος έναντι του ιδιωτικού, (ατομικού ή ομαδικού). Ο δρόμος αυτός είναι εξαιρετικά δύσκολος. Για να μπορέσουμε να τον βαδίσουμε είναι εντελώς απαραίτητη η ενεργητική παρουσία εκείνου του τμήματος της διανόησης που δεν έχει ενσωματωθεί στις διαδικασίες άλωσης του κράτους από οργανωμένα ιδιωτικά συμφέροντα. Το πιο αντιπροσωπευτικό αρνητικό παράδειγμα αποτελεί δυστυχώς μία μεγάλη μερίδα της Ελληνικής Πανεπιστημιακής διανόησης που έχει αναπτύξει χαρακτηριστικά μεσαιωνικού συντεχνιασμού, με αποτέλεσμα , όχι μόνο να μην βοηθά τους πολίτες να κατανοήσουν την πραγματικότητα, αλλά να τους προτρέπει στην ανομία και στην υπεράσπιση του ιδιωτικού απέναντι στο γενικό συμφέρον, με αποτέλεσμα να στρέφεται τελικά κατά των πιό αδύναμων ομάδων της κοινωνίας μας, των νέων, των ανέργων, των μειονοτήτων στο όνομα των οποίων-κατά τα λοιπά-ομνύει. Παρακολουθώντας συστηματικά το blog αυτό πιστεύω ότι το επιστημονικό του δυναμικό μπορεί να προσφέρει πολύ περισσότερα στην πατρίδα μας από την ήδη σημαντική προσφορά του.

    • Andreas says:

      Η μάχη του Ευρώ μαλλον έχει χαθει. Τωρα πρέπει να αρχίσουμε την μάχη για την επόμενη μέρα. Να χτίσουμε κάτι καλύτερο μετά την καταστροφή. Αυτή είναι ακόμα πιο μεγάλη μάχη. Αν δεν το κάνουμε η ιστορία θα είναι αδυσώπητη.

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